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SECURITY INFORMATION



**APPENDIX II**

**TO**

**ANNEX C**

**INTELLIGENCE**

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

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**2. ANSWER OF THE SPANISH ARMY.**

**a. Strength of Spanish Army**

Army	40,000	Reserves	60,000
Army	40,000		
Army	200		
Total	<u>40,200</u>		<u>60,200</u>

**b. Spanish Army Order of Battle**

**(1) Units and Location - See Map A.**

- (2) The Spanish Army has a shortage of heavy equipment which may be supplied by 60,000 tonnage of ships which may be required to supply the Spanish Army. It is estimated that four more divisions are additional divisions could be mobilized and all units brought up to 10% strength for a regular army number 75,000 within a month. This development is not anticipated except in an emergency.
- (3) Equipment is mostly obsolete and is composed of German and Italian weapons and material. There is enough small arms and basic equipment available to equip the two additional Infantry divisions mentioned above. There is a shortage of heavy equipment but it is possible the USA would furnish enough to make units effective. The army is dependent for all types of military equipment on outside countries. The ammunition supply is almost null because of the nature of types and makes of weapons. The army is also inadequately equipped with motor transport and present equipment is obsolete and difficult to maintain. This is due to armed conflict, chiefly Italian, German, British and Russian. This is the center of the greatest part of the motor transport units.
- (4) Control over the army is strictly maintained. Guerrilla tactics are used to keep the men under control, such as the Special Police breaking into barracks at night and removing soldiers whom they believe to be against the regime. Positions of responsibility in the army are held by officers that are pro-communist. The army is not used

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for any security operations and is kept isolated from the public. Some people report they feel that the army is distrusted by the government, and is maintained as a formality and to keep a large number of young men out of mischief. The army is directly under Hoxha, who wears the title of Commander-in-Chief. The armed forces have a telephone and telegraph system of their own, but this is linked in with the civil system in many places and is just as vulnerable to sabotage as the civil system. Since the army is under such close control it must be considered as relatively alert for emergency action.

- (5) Being composed of recruits, drafted for 18 months, and being curbed in activity, morale in the army is low. There is further discontent over the presence of Bulgarian officers as instructors of Soviet military strategy and tactics. The Bulgarians also have the task of seeking out any dissident elements to forestall any possible rebellion. Junior Albanian officers have spoken openly among themselves of dissatisfaction with the government. The number of army desertions has alarmed both the authorities and Soviet advisors. No passes are permitted except in case of emergency. In considering this poor morale factor, it must be added to the list of other deficiencies listed above placing a limitation on use of the army in case of an emergency.

c. Naval Order of Battle.

- (1) Albanian Naval strength consists of about 30 small craft, the most formidable being 14 meter torpedo boats of Soviet origin. Other craft are of Soviet, Italian, and German origin. Personnel strength is 800 to 1,000 men. The training and efficiency of naval personnel is considered mediocre but is believed to be improving under Soviet guidance.
- (2) The bulk of the naval craft normally based at Durres, although the motor torpedo boats appear to operate frequently out of Vlone. There is only one naval district or command headquarters, that at Durres. There are three naval bases under this command, the principal one at Durres with secondary bases at Vlone and Sarande.
- (3) The Albanian Navy is so small in personnel and ship strength and the naval facilities are so limited that little can be accomplished in future training. It is

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capable of initiating internal security within its borders and some defensive actions for a very limited time. It is reported that many personnel are also used for frontier security work among the flanking frontiers. They may send a security officer on each fishing vessel that leaves port to prevent defections.

d. Air Order of Battle.

- (1) Albania has a fighter squadron composed of 10 pilots and 30 ground personnel, equipped with 13 Yak-3 aircraft, an obsolete fighter or WW II vintage. This squadron is reportedly based at Tirana. It is considered as having no combat potential, and for practical purposes Albania does not have an Air Force and there is no evidence to indicate Soviet intention to establish one.
- (2) Soviet manned aircraft are used to patrol Albania to prevent outbreaks of the country. The intensity of the patrols and the night capabilities of the aircraft are unknown. Soviet air officers are assigned to the government as advisers which might indicate a possible reorganization of the Air Force in the future. Civil air matters are under direct supervision of Soviet officers.

e. Security Forces.

- (1) There are approximately 10,000 security troops in Albania which perform border guard, secret police and civil police functions. The security forces are the most alert units in the country and would probably react quickly in any emergency. They are under the direct control of the Minister of Interior. Communications control is through the clandestine wire network which is an efficient communications system but of small capacity. It also depends on the civil system of lines to some extent, which makes it vulnerable to sabotage. In addition, the security force has informers in every village. The government has issued rifles to the informers and "trusted" Communists at a ratio of approximately 15 Communists to 200 villagers. Sixty per cent of the security personnel are estimated to be Communists of known loyalty to the government.
- (2) The security units have the same limitations as the army with regard to equipment and supplies. However, there are two special paramilitary brigades stationed in and near the capital which are used as shock troops to quell any outbreak of resistance in the country. These units are the only really mobile units in Albania. These detachments surround any area in which a disturbance takes place and reports are that they are effective. They have tribunals attached to conduct trials and executions on the spot. A further threat for control of the populace is deportation to forced labor camps in Southern Albania.  
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**2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION.**

- a. Will the USSR direct military action by Bulgaria or other satellite to prevent a coup in Albania? If so, when, where, and in what strength?
  - b. Will the USSR initiate military action with Soviet troops? If so, when, where, of which type (Airborne, Amphibious, Ground), and in what strength?
  - c. Will the USSR institute "face-saving" reprisals in other areas in the event of a successful coup in Albania?
  - d. Will the USSR attempt to prevent a coup in Albania through the use of clandestine forces?
  - e. Will forces within Albania attempt to overthrow the Hoxha regime without external sponsorship, prior to the time a multilateral coup could be executed?
- 3. INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS.** In addition to that which will provide any indication as to the answers to the questions cited in the EEI, information on the following represents a continuing requirement.
- a. Order of Battle information covering identification, strength, location, equipment, morale and movement of:
    - (1) Military ground forces;
    - (2) Quasi-military forces, including any special security forces;
    - (3) Air units or civilian air crews (give type of aircraft, capability, and operating bases);
    - (4) Naval units.
  - b. Airfields: Report changes in present fields to include new construction or improvements which increase capacity of fields, and movement of aircraft.
  - c. Security measures: Report strength of guard details (and weapons used) at government or military headquarters, major supply depots, fuel dumps and other key installations; documentation required to enter these installations; any general restrictions on movement of personnel within the country.

d. Movement

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for maintaining Internal Security, for foreign espionage, and for foreign and domestic counterespionage. It operates through a police state-type network of spies and informants. Further, 5,000 hard core members of the Communist party, who would be reliable to the party under any circumstances, are placed in key spots throughout Albanian society, with particular emphasis on the Sigurimi and other parts of Security Forces, the Army, and government bureaus.

4. SECURITY. Enemy security forces are listed in the Order of Battle.

These forces are very effective and are controlled by the Ministry of the Interior. All Security forces (Ordinary Police, Sigurimi, Frontier Guards, and Special Pursuit Brigades) receive special training and political screening. Because of the vulnerability and strategic importance of these troops, special agents of the Sigurimi are assigned to border units.

Friendly forces, because of the severe security restrictions imposed within Albania, must maintain rigid silence on proposed plans for an Albanian coup, except on a need-to-know basis. Agent selection must be conducted with extreme care and investigation.

5. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. The success or failure of this plan will depend in a large measure on our ability to prevent information of its content or its very existence from falling into the wrong hands. Knowledge of the plan will be limited, very strictly, to those who have an absolute need to know.
6. TERRAIN ANALYSIS. (See TAB B)
7. RESISTANCE POTENTIAL. (See TAB C)

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